Neuroscientists study the brain at many different levels, from molecular to psychological. Despite progress on many of these levels, there is a disappointing lack of coherence in neuroscience research: we have yet to find an overarching theoretical framework for understanding what the brain does.
Level
Definition Example
Computational Sets out the goal of a process and an outline of how For binocular stereopsis, the input is (at least) the left theory it can be achieved in principle. This includes and right eyes' images; the output could be a depth defining the input, the output and establishing the map of features as viewed from a point midway constraints that will be used in computing one between the two eyes. An example of a constraint from the other.
is that a point in an image corresponds to one and only one scene point (as the scene point must be opaque for it to be visible). Algorithm Shows how a process is to be carried out. Gives Stereo algorithms often use sparse sets of features details of how the input and output are represented (such as light/dark boundaries) as their input. and a set of rules for the transformation between Coarse-to-fine algorithms compute depth in blurred the two.
versions of the input images and use the results to help solve ambiguities at finer scales. Implementation Specifies the physical method for carrying out an Disparity sensitive neurons have been identified at algorithm, for example in computer hardware or important stages in the process of stereopsis in using neurons.
animals, some closer to the 'input' stage, others apparently closer to the 'output' stage. However, we
do not yet know the algorithm or even the computational theory underlying the process these cells are involved in.
that "in perception, perhaps the nearest anyone came to the level of computational theory was Gibson". Gibson promoted an 'ecological' approach to studying vision, by which he meant that vision should be understood first and foremost as a tool that enables animals to achieve the basic tasks required for life: avoid obstacles, identify food or predators, approach a goal and so on (for example Gibson, 1979 Using optic flow to land a plane.
As the pilot approaches the air field, visible points move outwards, as shown by the arrows. Gibson described this as 'optic flow'. The point from which the flow emerges indicates the plane's direction of heading (in computer vision, this is called the 'epipole'). One strategy for landing the plane is to keep the epipole centred on the runway. (Adapted from Gibson (1979).)
In some ways, the strategy described here is deceptively simple. Gibson said that optic flow was only generated by translation of the observer (movement through space). Rotating the eye does not change the 'optic array' and so generates no optic flow. (This is not quite enough, however, to define optic flow: a choice must be made about how to relate different optic arrays. A sensible coordinate frame is one in which distant objects remain stationary, such as the mountains (Glennerster et al. 2001) ). Retinal flow is more complicated than optic flow. The eyes often rotate with respect to the world as, for example, when you fixate a nearby object and walk past it. The resulting 'rotational flow' is added to the 'pure' translational flow, which would be generated if you walked past the object fixating a distant point. Thought of in this way, retinal flow is a confusing mixture of two types of signal. Gibson himself was rather unclear on how the visual system was supposed to use 'optic flow' given that it must start off with retinal flow. There are two diverging hypotheses about how the brain deals with retinal flow. One assumes that the visual system extracts the 'translational' flow, shown by the arrows in this figure, by subtracting the rotational flow component (reviewed by Lappe et al., 1999) . Another assumes that the visuo-motor system uses task-specific strategies that avoid computing translational flow. For example, Cutting et al. (1992) suggest that observers could fixate on different points as they walk and, using a simple rule, change their direction of gaze until it is aligned with their direction of heading. The difference between these approaches is at the level of computational theory: they have different goals.
Current Biology basis of these, and of the information it has stored previously, the brain must generate a response (ultimately, a motor response). A reasonable model for this process is that one response is picked out of a list of possibilities by choosing the most appropriate in the organism's current context (for example, most probably rewarded or least probably punished).
It is here that Bayes' formula is useful. Bayes pointed out that the probability of state S being the case (such as 'there is a kettle over to my right') given information I (here, the sensory information the brain receives) is directly proportional to two quantities that can, in principle, be estimated in advance, and hence, in the context of the brain, stored in memory. The first quantity is the 'prior' probability of state S occurring, P(S). This makes sense intuitively: if you are forced to guess what the current state of the world is and you have no evidence (or highly inconclusive evidence) at the moment, you should guess a likely rather than an unlikely state (these prior probabilities being determined on the basis of previous experience). For example, if the kettle was on your right the last time you looked, it is a reasonable assumption that the fuzzy grey shape on the periphery of your vision is (still) the kettle.
The second quantity incorporates the actual data, I, and gives an indication of how conclusive it is. It is the probability of receiving evidence I given that the current state of the world really is S, normalised by the total probability of getting information I (summed over all possible states). Again, this makes sense intuitively. For example, fuzzy grey shapes are common in peripheral vision and do not always arise from kettles, so the evidence on its own is inconclusive. Fixating the kettle is a good way to improve the evidence. The higher resolution image is richer (and rarer) and more specific to kettles. In general, if sensory input I is both rare (P(I) is low) and also characteristic of state S (P(I|S) is high), then information I is good evidence that the world is in state S. Put more succinctly:
Bayes' rule can be derived from an assertion that the probability of S and I is equal to that of I and S. If the two joint probabilities are expressed in terms of conditional events, this becomes P(S|I) P(I) = P(I|S) P(S), from which the expression for P(S|I) can be obtained.
Many perceptual phenomena can be explained parsimoniously using a Bayesian approach (see Box 3 and a review by Knill and Richards (1996) ).
Bayesian inference fits well with all of Marr's levels of description. It is a useful tool in describing a problem at the level of computational theory, making
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Box 3.
A Bayesian model of a motion illusion.
When a narrow, low-contrast rhombus, as in A, is moved to the right it appears to move down as well (green arrow). This can be understood by (i) considering the set of stimuli that could have produced the edge motion signals the observer receives and (ii) including a 'prior' assumption that objects tend to move slowly (adapted from Weiss et al. 2002) . The left-hand plot in B shows the assumed 'prior' probability of velocities in horizontal and vertical directions (Vx, Vy), where intensity is proportional to probability: low velocities are favoured. The centre and right hand plots show the likelihood that an edge moving at each velocity (Vx, Vy) generated the motion observed at the points marked by the circles. For a high contrast edge, these velocities would all fall along a line. (The fact that the velocity of an edge is not known uniquely is known as the 'aperture problem': it arises because movement in the direction of the edge produces no local motion signal, for example within the circle.) The line is blurred for the low-contrast stimulus because, with some noise in the system, edges moving at other velocities can give rise to the same motion signal. The plot in C is obtained by multiplying the three plots in B together. This amounts to following Bayes' rule to calculate the probabilities that the real object had a velocity (Vx, Vy) which gave rise to the two motion signals measured at the circles (known as the 'posterior' probability). (Weiss et al. (2002) did this for all points in the stimulus, giving a very similar result.) The mean (or peak) of the distribution is shifted, as shown by the green 'X', away from the true velocity of the rhombus (shown by the '+'). It predicts the direction of motion seen by subjects when presented with this stimulus. This view brings Marr and Gibson's ideas together in another way. Gibson emphasised the role of vision as a tool for action. One of the things that makes human vision special is our ability to carry out tasks involving long sequences of movements, each one simple if considered in isolation, to achieve our goals. The processes involved in building up a vivid, detailed visual representation are perhaps best seen as a byproduct of that ability, taking time and being divisible into purposeful steps. But as Marr emphasised, whatever the processes turn out to be, emulating them computationally is the best way to understand them fully.
